“Astronomy leads us to a unique event, a universe which was created out of nothing, one with the very delicate balance needed to provide exactly the conditions required to permit life, and one which has an underlying (one might say ‘supernatural’) plan.”
- Arno Penzias (1933-present)
*Arno Penzias is an eminent American physicist who is most well known for his co-discovery of the microwave background radiation, for which he and physicist Robert Wilson were later awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1978. The discovery was notable in that it confirmed the predictions of the standard Big Bang model of the origin of the universe.
I don’t see arguments “from design” as being very convincing. After all, given that the universe is the only one to which we have access (after all, by definition it is “all there is”), from what basis can we make the determination that the universe is or isn’t “fine-tuned”? Such a conclusion would require the ability for one to compare the nature of this universe to a multitude of other universes by which the apparent “fine-tunedness” of the universe might be properly adjudicated.
From such an analysis, we might find that the universe is not as finely tuned as it could be, or that there is a greater range of permissibility for the “delicate balance” than we could have otherwise perceived.
But the fact of the matter is that we have no other universe to compare ours to, so the anthropic principle yet reigns. Despite the appearances of unlikelihood, the chances of the universe coming into its particular arrangement is precisely 100%.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment! I must admit that the question you raise is a difficult one of which much debate has been given between philosophers and scientists in the last few decades. However, despite the controversial nature of such a concept and the obvious inability for one to fully exhaust the dilemma here, I do believe that there are a few things that can be said about it. Namely, that although the Anthropic Principle does seem appealing on the surface, I find that it is a deceptively weak principle once one probes deeper into it.
I find that the strength of the Anthropic Principle seems to lie in it’s intuitiveness, as it essentially seems to argue that the inherent improbability of the features we observe about the universe, although itself seemingly intuitive, ultimately reduces to a mere “apparent” improbability. This “apparent” or “perceived” improbability, it is argued, stems from the fact that one can only observe properties of the universe which are consistent and compatible with their own existence, i.e. the universe they are already in. In other words, although the universe could have been different, if it were different, we would not have been able to observe it as it would have lacked the necessary properties to allow for one’s own existence (thus the seemingly 100% probability of our observing a fine-tuned universe as you mentioned). Now this in itself doesn’t seem to be a problem. After all, it is a scientific fact that I would be in complete agreement. Plus, it seems rather nonsensical to object that one could observe a life-prohibitive universe.
However, where I feel the argument begins to go astray is when it incorrectly moves from the scientific to the philosophical. In its philosophical form, the Anthropic Principle rightly argues that we should not be surprised that we do not observe a life-prohibitive universe (as we would not exist to observe such a universe). However that is not the claim in question. The claim in question is not whether or not we should be surprised that we DO NOT observe a life-PROHIBITIVE universe (of course we shouldn’t), rather, the claim in question is whether or not we should not be surprised that we DO observe a life-CONDUCIVE universe. Here I think the answer is, of course we should!
To clarify, John Leslie has given an excellent illustration in which he asks you to imagine that you have been dragged before a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen, all armed with rifles aimed at your heart, waiting for the execution command. Once the command is given, you instantly hear the sound of the rifles firing away, yet somehow you observe that you are still alive and that all of the 100 marksmen missed, which is very highly improbable. He argues that while it is true that you SHOULD NOT be surprised that you DO NOT observe that you are DEAD, nonetheless you SHOULD be surprised that you DO observe that you are ALIVE. In other words, your surprise at being alive is wholly appropriate, even though you are not surprised that you do not observe that you are dead, since if you were dead you could not observe it.
The same can be said about the fine-tuning of the universe. While we SHOULD NOT be surprised that we DO NOT observe features of the universe which are INCOMPATIBLE with our existence, it does not follow that we should not therefore be surprised that we DO observe features of the universe which are COMPATIBLE with our existence. Although apparently similar statements, they are in fact quite different, and to imply the truth of one onto the truth of the other is a demonstrably fallacious move. But this is what the Anthropic Principle in it’s philosophical form seemingly attempts to do. It is due to this mishap that I find the Anthropic Principle an ultimately weak argument against the various design arguments for the existence of God. Just because the fine-tuning of the universe for the existence of intelligent life is highly intrinsically improbable and that we could not have observed any other possible universe does not imply that we should not be surprised that we do observe a universe which is finely tuned for the existence of life.
Once again, given such a vast and controversial topic of much debate, one can only scratch the surface here. However, there is a great article on this very topic in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays (Problems in Contemporary Philosophy) titled, “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle,” by William Lane Craig and Mark McLeod that can be found online here.
I’m not sure I see the philosophical (or even phenomenological) impetus for the suggestion that we should be in any way surprised or otherwise intellectually moved by the observation that we live in an life-conducive universe. Such an idea is fundamentally rooted in the presumption that the constitution of universes is somehow “intrinsically improbable” for the creation of and preservation of life.
But upon what basis is such a claim made? As I pointed out in my previous post, there is nothing apart from our experience of a universe-conducive-to-life that we might compare our universe in the estimation of “intrinsic probabilities.” Therefore, the self-referential calculation about the probability of our own universe being conducive to life is not only fundamentally tautological, but is moreover based on a very limited set of data. The “intrinsic probability” of our universe being such that is is conducive to life is calculated from our quite limited understanding of what universes are like. Yet perhaps with time and research we will learn, in fact, that the “intrinsic probability” of life forming within universes is not only quite high, but necessarily assumed in all but the most extreme cases.
The point, of course, is not to argue that the universe is or isn’t intrinsically suited for life. There’s no way to know such a thing, and apart from the philosophically tenuous notion of somehow coming into knowledge of “other” universes, I see no methodologically sound way to even approach the question.
Rather, my suggestion is simply that to try find “design” in a closed, ultimately self-referential system of knowledge leads inevitably to an abortive “God-of-the-gaps” conclusion. As scientific knowledge evolves, things that appeared “improbable” or “impossible” or “miraculous” from one philosophical perspective may from another be easily explained on the basis of physicalism alone. I do not see that it is wise for religious thinking to try to establish itself in a domain in which it is necessarily alien. As the intervention of the divine within the universe is categorically not explicable on the basis of materialism (the domain in which human epistemology operates), no permanent gains could ever be made, and only long term harm can result.
If one believes that God created the universe (which I do), good and well. However, the moment that one seeks to establish this movement of faith within the realm of the material, one has necessarily jettisoned the true crisis of belief, exchanging it for whatever paltry “truths” one might be able to assert within the current philosophical hegemony, which “truths” will inevitably be rejected when new ways of thinking about and experiencing the universe are devised.
One additional thought: I do have to disagree about the propriety of the “100 marksmen” example to the discussion.
I see it as a rather inapplicable illustration because the admitted “surprise” by the would-be-executed is based on a vast array of knowledge and experience against which to adjudicate the probability of the actual outcome. In regards to the universe, no such wealth of knowledge or experience exists.
For example, with the execution scenario, we have lots of disparate experiences that we can cite of what happens when bullets are fired from rifles, particularly in relation to their interactions with human bodies. Moreover, we also have untold numbers of experiences with such projectiles being utilized by those expert in their duties of brandishing rifles.
So then, from hundreds of millions of observable scenarios, we can form some idea of the probability that the person to be executed will, in fact, be killed by the marksmen.
But while this example works in a very anecdotal way for common experiences, can it really be judiciously applied to determining the “intrinsic probability” that our universe would evolve to be conducive to life? We have no experience beyond the sheer fact that our universe is conducive to life, and despite the apparent fabricated “probabilities” about the same, our conclusion regarding all conceptually possible universes–based on the only data to which we have access–is that, in fact, we should expect that universes are intrinsically conducive to life.
So if we apply the singular nature of the knowledge we have about the universe to the example of the marksmen, a different story appears altogether. In this scenario, we would have to approach the execution with no knowledge of what bullets do, outside of what we experience in this particular execution. When the marksmen fire, and the prisoner is found alive after the smoke clears, would we not have to conclude that insofar as our understanding of rifles and bullets is based exclusively on this singular event, this is what we should expect to see in other executions of a similar constitution? Or, as a counterpoint, upon what basis would we make a determination that the event we witnessed was “intrinsically improbable,” given that this experience was the only one to which we had access in the formulation of our conclusion?